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abstract Judgments about the validity of at least some elementary inferential patterns
(say modus ponens) are a priori if anything is. Yet a number of empirical conditions must
in each case be satisfied in order for a particular inference to instantiate this or that infer-
ential pattern. We may on occasion be entitled to presuppose that such conditions are
satisfied (and the entitlement may even be a priori), yet only experience could tell us that
such was indeed the case. Current discussion about a perceived incompatibility between
content externalism and first-person authority exemplifies how damaging the neglect of
such empirical presuppositions of correct reasoning can be. An externalistic view of mental
content is ostensibly incompatible with the assumption that a rational subject should be
able to avoid inconsistency no matter what the state of her empirical knowledge may be.
That fact, however, needs not be taken (as it often is) as a reductio of externalism: alter-
natively, we may reject that assumption, adding to the agenda of a philosophical investi-
gation of rationality an examination of the vicissitudes of logical luck. I offer an illustra-
tion and defense of that alternative.
keywords Inference; Presupposition; Content externalism; Logical luck
This is how the story goes: you should not be held responsible for what
evades your control. It is not for you to stop the autumn leaves from
falling.‘Ought’, we are told, implies ‘can’.
The story has been challenged. Moral luck has been a lively issue in
ethics since the exchange between Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel
which sparked the debate over thirty years ago (see WILLIAMS 1976,
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NAGEL 1976).The reckless driver who passes a red light may be lucky
enough that no pedestrian is crossing the street; but, red lights or no, if a
child comes running after a ball and gets hit, that will make all the differ-
ence.The moral difference:‘We feel sorry for the driver, but that sentiment
co-exists with, indeed presupposes, that there is something special about his
relation to the happening, something which cannot merely be eliminated
by the consideration that it was not his fault.’ (WILLIAMS 1976: 28).
Jurisprudence, a realm where consequences always matter, has long
known the doctrine of strict liability, which features in judicial settle-
ments of torts and criminal accountability. In the English case of Rylands
v. Fletcher (1868), the defendants’ underground water reservoir caused an
old mine shaft owned by the plaintiff to collapse; although the court
found that the defendants were not negligent, they were still strictly liable
for damages.1
As we’ll see in a while, it’s not so much that ‘ought’ will not imply
‘can’, just like that. Rather, there will be more to ‘can’ than meets the
eye. Specifically, there are some tricky questions to be faced concerning
how actual control (or lack thereof) relates to control in what we keep
calling, for want of better words, close enough possible worlds. The
unlucky driver who hit the child had actually no control over the
outcome; but it might have been otherwise: that’s how issues of negligence
bear on such matters.
Now moral luck itself is not, you guess, my topic; but the background
assumption about the connection between responsibility and control lies
at the heart of what I am after here.
My aim, in brief, is to bring into sharper focus what Roy Sorensen, in
a highly perceptive (if, sad to say, largely unheeded) paper, proposed to
call ‘logical luck’ (SORENSEN 1998). It was Sorensen’s original insight
that current debates on content externalism (specifically as they bear on
the apriority of our logical abilities) are fruitfully illuminated when set
against the framework provided by comparison with the prima facie unre-
lated topic of moral luck. I may eventually have some reservation to
voice about Sorensen’s unabashedly consequentialist approach to blame-
worthiness; unlike Sorensen, moreover, I will make essential use of a
distinction between excusable and inexcusable ignorance: something
which the prevailing approach to the ‘externalism and inference’ debate
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(relying, as it does, on the ‘slow switching’ thought experiments intro-
duced by Burge in 1988) has made all but invisible.
Grub first, then ethics, recommended Brecht. Let me follow the
advice by starting with the daily bread of some very elementary, ground
floor pieces of reasoning. Somewhat fancier scenarios, most notably
involving switches between Earth and Twin Earth, will show up as we go
along.And then, when the ease of such flights of fancy will have made
things really impossible for us (as impossible they have actually become
in the present state of the art) we’ll dutifully turn to ethics for some guid-
ance. First things first, though.
If this paperweight is a stone from Walden Pond, then something is a
stone from Walden Pond. Likewise, if everything must perish, then Vani-
na must perish. Or so it seems; but appearances mislead.
For, come to think, what exactly (if anything, that is) was meant by
‘this paperweight’ in the preceding paragraph? Suppose I wrote that at
home, where I actually have a paperweight on my desk; and suppose
further that, as I wrote it, I was actually attending to that (one and only)
paperweight on my desk. Now if that is a stone from Walden Pond, then,
sure, something is a stone from Walden Pond.Yet mark how much you
had to assume.
Or how little: for it all boils down to ‘this paperweight’ meaning some-
thing – to the predicate ‘is a stone from Walden Pond’ being, truly or false-
ly, ascribed to something.
Again, if everything must perish, so must Vanina – provided, that is,
‘Vanina’ names something. (The only Vanina I can think of is a character
in a Stendhal short story.And sure I know better than infer from ‘Every-
thing must perish…’ that a fictional object must perish.)
That is rather trite, yet enough to get us going. For it would seem that
whether an entailment holds should be settled by logic alone; yet haven’t
we just seen it to be otherwise? After all, what is at stake in both my
examples is a matter of truth – of contingent truth at that: the existence
and uniqueness of a certain piece of stone, the identity of Vanina, whoev-
er she may be. And what has logic to do with that? ‘Logic’, wrote
Wittgenstein, ‘precedes every experience – that something is so. It is
before the How, not before the What.’ (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,
5.552, in the Ogden translation).Whether something exists – let alone
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whether it remains the same or undergoes change – is supposed to be no
concern of logic at all. In Hegel’s epigram, logic is ‘the exposition of God
as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite
mind’ (1812: 50). Both remarks are apt to sound as dark sayings of old,
representative of their authors’ shared penchant for the oracular, yet here
is what Quine has to say about the inference rules we know as ∃-intro-
duction and ∀-elimination:
“The principle embodied in these two operations is the link between
quantifications and the singular statements that are related to them as
instances.Yet it is a principle only by courtesy. It holds only in the case
where a term names and, furthermore, occurs referentially. It is simply
the logical content of the idea that a given occurrence is referential.
The principle is for this reason, anomalous as an adjunct to the purely
logical theory of quantification”. (QUINE 1953: 146)
What exactly Quine (of all people) may have meant by ‘the logical
content’ of an idea is a matter for conjecture. But if he is right about ∃-
introduction and ∀-elimination, then much the same would seem to apply
to pretty any inference rule you could think of. From ‘Laura is Canadian’
and ‘Laura is blonde’ we are entitled to infer ‘Laura is a blonde Canadian’ –
provided, that is, the name ‘Laura’, in both occurrences, denotes the same
individual. The rule which licenses the inference ‘is simply the logical
content of the idea’ that the two occurrences are co-referential.
These ‘ideas’ (about existence, uniqueness or what have you) are empir-
ical assumptions – they may well turn out to be false; and we should count
ourselves rather lucky that, on the whole, ‘we live in a world in which
objects and stuffs are generally stable, and we are not switched by evil
demons from one planet to another’ (FALVEY 2003: 238).
Yet, if once in a while, shifts happen. Suppose as I’m coming home in
the afternoon I notice this beautiful Golden Retriever dog playing
around in my neighbor’s front yard. I stop for a while to pet my new
acquaintance, who turns out to be very amiable.As I walk home I think
‘That’s a very friendly dog.’
Now, a couple of days later, same scene – or so it seems. Here’s the
nice front yard with its blooming bushes and this beautiful golden dog
running around.Again I stop, hoping to attract the dog’s attention, resort-
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ing perhaps to whistling or finger clapping, yet this time to no avail: the
dog keeps running nonstop around the yard, heedless of my inviting
moves, barking up every other tree. Maybe he’s spotted a cat, who knows.
I walk home thinking:‘That’s a very restless dog’.
Am I now entitled to infer that there is a dog in my neighborhood
who is both friendly and restless?
1. Fa
2. Ga
3. ∃x (Fx^Gx)
Well, suppose my neighbor is a breeder of Golden Retrievers and
what I successively spotted on those two occasions were a pair of siblings
from the same litter – call them Harry the Friendly and Barry the Rest-
less.As things go, Harry is not excitable at all, while Barry is of a rather
unfriendly disposition. Suppose further there are no other dogs in the
neighborhood. So my conclusion is just false, and my reasoning is
unsound – a plain fallacy of equivocation. Its form is not 1-3 but rather:
4. Fa
5. Gb
6. ∃x (Fx^Gx)
And the trouble lies in the way my mistaken empirical assumption (that
there was one single dog which I encountered twice) impinges on my
grasp of the logical form of the inference I performed – specifically in my
taking 4-6 to be of the form 1-3. For it’s not as if I inferred validly, except
that my inference relied on a tacit (and false) identity premise (namely that
Harry = Barry) – so that my reasoning was really an enthymeme:
7. Fa
8. Gb
9. a=b
10. ∃x (Fx^Gx)
I’ll come back to that suggestion; in the meantime, let me just remark
that whatever I may have presupposed (about existence, uniqueness, or
what have you), is better not construed as amounting to an additional
premise in my reasoning.That way, we’ll see, madness lies.
Now there is a powerful recipe to make such uneventful mishaps as
my unlucky inference about the dogs in the neighborhood sound really
dramatic – so much so that what will seem to be at stake is nothing less
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than ‘the apriority of our logical abilities’ (BOGHOSSIAN 1992: 17).
And that is to indulge in some science fiction – or, as philosophers of an
analytic bent prefer to say, do some thought experiments.
Now I won’t rehearse once again Putnam’s Twin Earth or Burge’s
‘arthritis’ fictions. I just want to focus on this methodological feature
shared by both: the appeal to pairs of epistemically indiscernible coun-
terpart worlds.
Here is then the subject in Putnam’s scenario, who thinks that the
glass she holds is filled with the insipid, odorless etc. liquid she calls
‘water’. And here are the two counterpart worlds: in Possible World 1,
‘water’ denotes H2O; in Possible World 2,‘water’ denotes XYZ.That, as we
all know, will impinge on where meanings are to be found; but, for
current purposes, here is what really matters to me: the relevant differ-
ence (H2O / XYZ) is stipulated to be inaccessible from the first person
perspective: that’s built into the thought experiment as we tell it.2
And this is what engaging in thought experiments (stipulating, as
Kripke says, a possible world), amounts to: we, the runners of the
thought experiment, know what our characters are stipulated to ignore.
Their ignorance (among other things, of what may, on occasion, impinge
on the soundness of their reasoning) is, accordingly, excusable if any
ignorance is.3
That’s, of course, what raises the vexed problem about externalism and
first person authority. As Tyler Burge aptly sums it up: “How can one
individuate one’s thoughts when one has not, by empirical methods,
discriminated the empirical conditions that determine those thoughts
from empirical conditions that would determine other thoughts?’
(BURGE 1988: 116)
The slow switching thought experiments introduced by Burge in
‘Individualism and Self-Knowledge’ (1988), in which Earth and Twin
Earth coexist in the same possible world, are meant to bring into focus
the diachronic dimension of the First Person Authority Problem: namely,
the impact of shifting contextual parameters on a subject’s ability to
retain and redeploy conceptual contents. Here’s Burge, and bear with me
to have him quoted at some length:
“Suppose that one underwent a series of switches back and forth
between actual earth and actual twin earth so that one remained in
190
doispontos, Curitiba, São Carlos, vol. 6, n. 2, p.185-201, outubro, 2009
each situation long enough to acquire concepts and perceptions
appropriate to that situation. Suppose occasions where one is
definitely thinking one thought, and other occasions where one is
definitely thinking its twin. Suppose also that the switches are carried out
so that one is not aware that a switch is occurring.The continuity of one’s life
is not obviously disrupted. So, for example, one goes to sleep one night
at home and wakes up in twin home in twin bed – and so on. (Your
standard California fantasy.) Now suppose that, after decades of such
switches, one is told about them and asked to identify when the
switches take place.The idea is that one could not, by making
comparisons, pick out the twin periods from the ‘home periods’”.
(BURGE 1988: 115. My emphasis, PF).
As we should expect, slow switching will have a bearing on ‘any reason-
ing that takes place over time, hence any reasoning’ (BURGE 1998: 363).
For one thing, the subject’s ability to assess rightness of inference would
seem to be jeopardized by his unawareness that he’s been switched.
That was the problem raised by Boghossian in ‘Externalism and Infer-
ence’: externalism ‘is inconsistent with the thesis that our thought
contents are epistemically transparent to us (...) this is true in a sense that
falsifies another important and traditionally held view – that we can
detect a priori whether our inferences are logically valid or not.’
(BOGHOSSIAN 1992: 13)
And, to be sure, that would be very disturbing indeed. After all, the
main interest (and, just possibly, the main promise) of externalism lies in
its acknowledgement of the impact of exposure to changing contexts on
the constitution of thought contents.That’s precisely what explains the
interest aroused, in the literature about externalism, by cases of context-
switch, often illustrated with such elaborate fantasies about space-travel-
ling from Earth to Twin Earth and back, interplanetary abductions and
like exercises in science fiction. At the end of the day, such exercises
should have been just a device to graphically describe a range of much
less extraordinary phenomena which, if externalism is right, take place in
a variety of situations prompted by exposure to differences (for instance,
though not only, of a cultural nature) between the contexts in which the
rational capacities of a single subject must be exercised.
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Anyway, that’s the setting of Boghossian’s problem about externalism
and inference (BOGHOSSIAN 1992). Boghossian’s argument has the
form of a reductio ad absurdum: the truth of externalism implies the possi-
bility of undetectable errors in reasoning, due to unperceived shifts in
propositional content.That possibility clashes with the transparence of
mental content; therefore, externalism is false.
Suppose that, having enjoyed a happy childhood on Earth, I am some-
day carried away to Twin Earth.And suppose further, as Burge asks us to,
that ‘that the switches are carried out so that one is not aware that a
switch is occurring.The continuity of one’s life is not obviously disrupt-
ed.’ (BURGE 1988: 115). I just wake up on Twin Earth in twin bed and
everything looks exactly as before. (Remember, that was built into the
thought experiment). In due time, according to externalist common
wisdom, my usage of the term ‘water’ comes to mean what the linguistic
community to which I now belong uses it to mean: namely, XYZ.And
here I am, inferring from the conjunction of true premises
11. I enjoyed playing in water (=H2O) when I was a kid (from memory)
12.This glass is full of water (=XYZ) (from current perception) the false
conclusion
13.This glass is full of the same liquid I enjoyed playing in when I was
a kid.
Worse still, the fallacy I fall prey to is not comparable to the usual
fallacy of equivocation, in which an ambiguity is neglected, and the
reasoner is in principle in a position to detect and rectify, on a wholly a
priori basis, the flaw in her reasoning. In the slow switching scenarios,
there is just nothing the subject can do to prevent or fix the irrationality,
short of undertaking an empirical investigation of the environment, and
of her own personal history.
Worse still, given the conditions built into the slow switching stories,
it is (to put it mildly) unclear what such an ‘empirical investigation’ could
possibly look like. It’s not as if there might be traces, like a flight ticket
from Earth to Twin Earth in the inside pocket of your jacket, or custom
papers attached to your passport, or a message from home in the answer-
ing machine.The two worlds were stipulated to be indiscernible, exact
duplicates (apart from the single ‘external’ difference): were it not so, we
would have learnt nothing from the fictions.
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That’s how logical luck turns out to be, as much as its moral equiva-
lent, a matter of indiscernible counterparts. Here is a putatively sound
reasoning:
14. Fa
15. Ga
16. ∃x(Fx^Gx)
Now add subscripts to your non-logical constants, if only to mark that
they are different tokens of the same type, hence not logically assured to
be co-referential:
17. Fa1
18. Ga2
19. ∃x(Fx^Gx)
And there we are: in Possible World 1, d(‘a1’)=d(‘a2’), and the inference
is sound. Switch to Possible World 2, where d(‘a1’)≠d(‘a2’) and 17-19 is
(again) a fallacy of equivocation.Trouble is, possible worlds 1 and 2 are
not like, say, Barcelona and Valencia.They’re way more like a world in
which I am ‘sitting by the fire, dressed in a winter cloak, touching this
paper with my hands, and the like’ and one which is an artifact of ‘some
evil spirit who is supremely powerful and cunning and who has expend-
ed all his energy in deceiving me’.4 
The perception that there’s not much that the victims of slow switch-
ing can do to detect the external sources of their possible logical short-
comings – a perception which I find to be widespread (if mostly tacit) in
the literature – answers for the surprising willingness, displayed by friends
and foes of externalism alike, to devise exculpating moves as a response
to these scenarios of logical misfortune.
After all, the only difference between the lucky and the unlucky
reasoners lies wholly beyond their ken. I suppose Boghossian speaks for
most writers in the field when he writes:‘It seems to me that there is an
immediately recognizable sense in which there can be no difference in
respect of rationality between [the reasoner in Possible World 1 and that in Possi-
ble World 2]. It seems implausible in the extreme to say that they differ in
their capacity to reason’.’ (BOGHOSSIAN 1992: 27).
That is of course an eminently plausible appraisal, given what the
differences between the two contrasting worlds are supposed to be. Small
wonder, then, that  the choices on offer are (again, with the remarkable
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exception of SORENSEN 1998) a variety of exculpating moves,
designed to shield the rationality of the possibly unlucky reasoner against
the contingencies of context-shifting. (See, e.g. SCHIFFER 1992,
BURGE 1998, LUDLOW 2004, SOSA 2005, COLLINS 2008.)
The internalistic exculpating move will predictably recoil from the
broader and unsafer landscape to an inner domain, a.k.a. narrow content,
sealed off from the contingencies of external causation, accident, and
luck. Here is how Boghossian introduces it:“If, then, it is also true that
there is an important sense in which [the reasoner’s] behavior makes sense
from his point of view, we would appear to have here an argument for the
existence of a level of intentional description which conserves that
sense’. (BOGHOSSIAN 1992: 28).5
A bit more surprising are the externalistic exculpations,paramount among
which is the Schiffer-Burge “anaphoric” view of content preservation.6
The main idea here is that the reiteration, in an occurrent episode of
thinking, of the content of a past thought is made possible by a depend-
ency relation comparable to that which holds between relative pronouns,
and other anaphoric expressions, and their antecedents in the linguistic
constructions in which they feature. In ‘Laura was confident that she
would get the prize’, the pronoun ‘she’ designates Laura: its semantic
value is determined by the anaphoric antecedent which is the proper
name – as the value of a bound variable in first order quantification is
determined by the quantifier which is its anaphoric antecedent. Hence,
the unhappy reasoning 11-13 would get reinterpreted as:
20. I enjoyed playing in water when I was a kid 
21.This glass is full of that ↑.
22.This glass is full of the same liquid I enjoyed playing in when I was
a kid.
Here I resort to ‘that ↑’ to mark the anaphoric dependence of ‘water’,
as it was (presumably) tokened by the reasoner in premise 21, on its occur-
rence in premise 20.And what we have as a result is, small wonder, a valid
argument with a false premise: as ‘water’ in 20 denotes H2O (the thought
content here being supplied by preservative memory), premise 21 amounts
to the false judgment that the Twin Earth glass is full of H2O.
A more surprising externalistic path to exculpation is provided by
Peter Ludlow’s “Orwellian” theory of content preservation. On Ludlow’s
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theory, ‘it is not the job of memory to record contents, but rather to
provide information about past episodes relative to current environmen-
tal conditions.’ (LUDLOW 1996: 316).7 As in Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-
Four, the past is rewritten from the standpoint and priorities of the pres-
ent. Hence when I, on Twin Earth, recall having played in water as a kid,
the content of my “Orwellian” memory is the false judgment that I
played in twater (XYZ).The outcome is, again, a valid judgment with a
false premise:
23. I enjoyed playing in water (XYZ) when I was a kid. (False) 
24.This glass is full of water (XYZ). (True) 
25.This glass is full of the same liquid I enjoyed playing in when I was
a kid. (False).
Now there’s no question that all these different construals somehow
manage to take into account the fact that, as Boghossian says, the reason-
er’s behavior ‘makes sense from his point of view’.What is not so conspic-
uous is the sheer absence, built into the very terms of the slow switching thought
experiments, of any other point of view against which the subject might try
and assess the soundness of her reasonings. And that is my complaint
against the freewheeling use of so many thought experiments in contem-
porary analytical philosophy: we end up losing some of our grip on what
things look like in some real life, down to earth surroundings.
The shared assumption underlying all the exculpating moves we have
considered is explicitly stated by David Sosa in a recent, very illuminat-
ing paper: ‘Ignorance is insufficient for incoherence: inferring subjects are in
principle in a position to avoid invalidity, no matter what their state of
knowledge (indeed, no matter what the truth of their premiss beliefs).’
(SOSA 2005: 219).
As the attentive reader will not have failed to notice, there is a further
assumption at work here: namely, that ignorance is always excusable.
Which, as I stressed, makes perfect sense in the fancy setting of the slow
switching thought experiments. There was indeed virtually nothing that
the switched subjects could do to prevent the fallacies of equivocation
they were prone to – hence the appeal of the exculpating moves we
briefly reviewed.
When it comes to down to earth reasoning, though, there’s much that
a subject is justifiably expected to know and duly take into account.
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Suppose I left an empty glass on my desk as I went out for a haircut. Back
home an hour later, I notice that the glass on the desk is now full and
infer, at my own peril, that the glass which was previously empty is now
full.At my own peril, I stress, as I am neglecting the likelihood that the
housemaid, profiting from my absence to tidy up my office, brought a
new, full glass to replace the previous, dusty one, as she often does.
Neglect of this easily available piece of information is comparable to my
not taking into account the well-known fact that my neighbor is a
breeder of Golden Retriever dogs, which increases the likelihood that it
was not the same dog I met on those two occasions.
Or think, for a change, of reasonings involving tensed statements. I
may know for sure that Laura is singing; and then, with equal certainty,
that she is dancing. But to infer from this pair of true statements that
someone is both singing and dancing betrays an inexcusable neglect of
well-known facts about the truth-conditions of tensed statements.8
Of course, in down to earth reasoning, we take a lot for granted.As
Strawson wryly remarks: “Our methods, or criteria, of reidentification
must allow for such facts as these: that the field of our observation is
limited; that we go to sleep; that we move.That is to say, they must allow
for the facts that we cannot at any moment observe the whole of the
spatial framework we use, that there is no part of it that we can observe
continuously, and that we ourselves do not occupy a fixed position with-
in it.’ (STRAWSON 1959: 32)
At t1, I see an object a1 and think ‘This is F’.At t2, I see an object a2
and think ‘This is G’.Then I draw the conclusion: ‘Something is both F
and G’.When am I entitled to that conclusion? Well, of course, whenev-
er a1=a2. But was that a tacit premise, and my inference, therefore, an
enthymeme? That way, I suggested, madness lies. For suppose 
26. Fa1
27. Ga2
are not enough to for you to infer ‘∃x(Fx^Gx)’.After all, you need to
make sure that ‘a1’ and ‘a2’ are co-referential.That is, you need the further
premise:
28. a1=a2
But that’s not gonna do, either. For now you have to make sure that
‘a1’, as it occurs in 26, and ‘a1’ as it occurs in 28 are also co-referential;
and ditto for ‘a2’ as it occurs in 27 and ‘a2’ as it occurs in 28.At which
point it is manifest that you are embarked on a vicious, Lewis Carroll-
style, regress.9
The moral is, to be sure, that reasoning about changing objects
(reasoning for which existence, uniqueness or permanence assumptions
may be crucial) is an essentially unsafe business, in which we are bound
to riskily take an awful lot for granted.That’s what makes us subjects of
logical luck, and the extent of our accountability will be a matter of the
excusableness of our ignorance.Which brings us to the point at which, as
I suggested, we may usefully turn to ethics for some guidance.
The legal philosopher H. L.A. Hart opens a paper on criminal respon-
sibility with the following imagined dialogue:‘I didn’t mean to do it: I just
didn’t think.’‘But you ought to have thought.’ (HART 1961: 136)
‘Ought’ implies ‘can’, to be sure. It is not, in such cases as Hart discuss-
es, as if there was nothing the defendants could possibly have done to
avoid the unfortunate outcome. Rather: what actually evades the control
of the subject would be under her full control in close enough (and,
moreover, epistemically accessible) possible worlds.The owner of a rundown
house may, as a matter of fact, ignore that the ceiling is about to collapse.
Yet that would be a manifest case of inexcusable ignorance.The relevant infor-
mation was fully available, had she only cared to go after it.
In such down to earth cases, the information which the subject actu-
ally lacks is available: the subject would be apprised of it if only she cared
enough to know. Not so on the slow switching scenarios – hence the
exculpating moves of which I was complaining.
In what is likely to be one of the most gnomic elucidations of the
concept of inexcusable ignorance,Wittgenstein writes:‘That I am a man
and not a woman can be verified, but if I were to say I was a woman, and
then tried to explain the error by saying I hadn’t checked the statement,
the explanation would not be accepted.’ (WITTGENSTEIN 1969, § 79)
Epistemology, including the epistemology of reasoning, has been, for
most of its history, this cantankerous discipline in which we keep asking
whether and how we possibly know anything. Much of what I was argu-
ing for may be summed up in the idea that it is high time for a change of
gear. As I draw some encouragement to think so from Elizabeth
Anscombe, let me give her the last word:‘The interesting enquiries about
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knowledge, once one has given up the attempt to characterize it as a sort
of belief that satisfies certain conditions, concern what everyone, or
everyone in certain cultures, can be assumed to know once grown-up
and reasonably competent: and the relation of some claims of knowledge
to questions like:“How do you know?”’ (ANSCOMBE 1993: 32).10
1 Compare Article 927, single paragraph, of the Brazilian Civil Code: ‘The defendant will
be liable for damages, independently of guilt, in such cases as are stipulated in statute, or when
the defendant’s usual activity implies, by its own nature, risk for the rights of others.’ [My
emphasis, PF.]
2 And here is, for the sake of comparison, Burge’s scenario: the subject thinks that the painful
ailment in his thigh is arthritis. In Possible World 1,‘arthritis’ denotes an inflammation of joints
(and the subject has a false belief). In Possible World 2,‘arthritis’ denotes a number of rheuma-
toid ailments (and the subject has a true belief). Again, the two possible worlds are indis-
cernible “from the first person perspective”.
3 That thought experiments are stipulations; that these stipulations are such that it will often
be the case that we, who make them, will know an awful lot that their protagonists are
designed to ignore: these points have been forcefully made, as was fairly pointed out by an
anonymous referee to this journal, in SILVA FILHO 2006, to which the reader is referred.
Where I seem to part company with Silva Filho is in my disinclination to take the workings
of an ‘omniscient narrator’ as casting suspicion on the methodology of the externalist (or, for
that matter, any) thought experiments. There’s nothing wrong with stipulating possible
worlds, no matter how contrived, and nothing to regret about omnisciences which are as
much artifacts of the stipulating game as is, say, the ignorance of the slow-switched subjects
about their surroundings. I have no qualms with the narrator’s omniscience; what troubles me
is her all but unavoidable (logical) leniency: again, let there be no doubt, a matter of how the
story is told.
4 Honni soit qui mal y pense! I hope to elaborate on these dangerous liaisons elsewhere. (For
those who may care: the Descartes quotes come from Harry G. Frankfurt’s translation in
FRANKFURT 1970: 10, 13).
5The move bears comparison with Kant’s forceful “shrinking” of the proper domain of moral
assessment to the inner realm where a pure will operates by itself, sealed off alike from the
vagaries of causation, contingency and luck. See Bernard Williams’ perceptive discussion in
WILLIAMS 1976.
6 See SCHIFFER 1992, BURGE 1998.
7 The theory is further articulated in LUDLOW 2004.
8 ‘Our inferential practice exploits a convenient insensitivity to the specific context of our
judgments.As a result, we sometimes run into trouble. One example may be the philosophi-
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cal tendency to suppose that change is contradictory: the disposition to connect judgments
inferentially (…) might overspill into the inference from the true judgement ‘Judy is dancing’
and the true judgement made a second later ‘Judy is not dancing’ to the self-contradictory
judgement ‘Someone is both dancing and not dancing’. (WILLIAMSON, 1997: 652-3)
9 Argument credit: John Campbell (see CAMPBELL 1987; and, for a brief restatement,
CAMPBELL 1994: 75-6).
10 Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the Porto Alegre colloquium ‘Semantics and
Cognition’ (July 2009), and at the Fortaleza conference ‘Thought Experiments and the A
Priori’ (August 2009). I thank audiences at both venues for their responses. I am especially
grateful to André J.Abath and Rogério Severo (in Porto Alegre), and to Ernest Sosa, Christo-
pher Hill, Jonathan Ichikawa,Anand Vaidya,Albert Casullo and Jens Kipper (in Fortaleza) for
their comments. My gratitude extends to the students who attended a graduate seminar on
Cognitive Dynamics I gave at my home university in 2009; to an anonymous referee for this
journal, who very perceptively singled out the most pressing task with respect to which I
remain an insolvent debtor (namely that of going beyond my vague and blatantly insufficient
appeal to the notion of ‘epistemically accessible possible worlds’ in articulating criteria for
inexcusableness of ignorance); and, last and not least, to the editor this special issue, André
Porto, for the unfailing patience and good humor with which he met my delinquency in
complying with renewed submission deadlines.
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